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ARTICLE
WE CAN WORK IT OUT: CO-OP COMPULSORY
LICENSING AS THE WAY FORWARD IN IMPROVING
ACCESS TO ANTI-RETROVIRAL DRUGS
HORACE E. ANDERSON, JR.'
"Our vision is that people everywhere have access to the essential
medicines they need; that the medicines are safe, effective and of assured
quality; and that they are prescribed and used rationally."
World Health Organization 2
"A lack of credible patent rights for pharmaceuticals in the developing
world may do far more harm in the long run than their absence can
accomplish in the short run."
Alan 0. Sykes3
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I. INTRODUCTION
An enduring fact of the global battle against HIV/AIDS is the problem of
providing access to anti-retroviral drugs ("ARVs") to all those who need them.
ARVs and other essential medicines are generally protected by patent law, and
they can be prohibitively expensive for persons in the developing world.4 A
number of strategies have been employed over time to increase access to
essential medicines, including exclusion of pharmaceutical inventions from
patent protection, enactment of curtailed patent protection for drugs,
imposition of compulsory licensing, provision of medicines at discounted
prices, and implementation of drug donation programs. 5 One of the more
recent attempts has been the amendment of the Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property ("TRIPS") to allow countries with
manufacturing capacity (most likely middle-income countries with histories of
generic drug production such as Brazil and India) to manufacture generic
versions of patented drugs and export them at low prices to countries lacking
the ability to manufacture.
In theory, the compulsory licensing scheme created by this amendment (the
"Health Flexibility Waiver" or "Waiver") should provide an avenue for
increased access by allowing countries with the means and desire to
manufacture to serve those countries whose public health needs are not served
by the default system of strong pharmaceutical patent protection. 6 In practice,
however, the Health Flexibility Waiver is severely underutilized, with only one
country signing on as an exporter of a generic drug and one country signing on
as an importer of that drug as of the time of this writing.7 Commentators have
' Although the access problem is not limited to HIV/AIDS and ARVs, the human impact
(and the potential for improvement) of the HIV crisis in the developing world has made
ARVs the most cited example in the access debate. This paper's focus on ARVs reflects
their prominence in the public debate, but the hope is that the ideas developed herein may be
useful in improving access with respect to other therapies and other diseases as well.
5 See, e.g., DORIS ESTELLE LONG & ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 126 (West Group 2000); Merck, Fighting River Blindness,
http://merck.com/responsibi lity/access/access-feature-meetizan.html (last visited May 22,
2010).
6 See Press Release, World Trade Organization, Decision Removes Final Patent Obstacle
to Cheap Drug Imports (Aug. 30, 2003), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/newse/pres03_e/pr350_e.htm.
7 Canada has signed on as an exporting country, and Rwanda as an importing country.
The Canadian generics producer Apotex has been authorized to manufacture and export to
Rwanda 260,000 packs of TriAvir, a fixed-dose combination of the patented ARVs
Zidovudine, Lamivudine, and Nevirapine. See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Notification Under Paragraph 2(A) of the Decision of 30
August 2003 on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health - Rwanda, IP/N/9/RWA/I (July 19, 2007), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/GENhighLightParent.asp?qu=%28+%40meta%5FSymbol+IP%F
CN%FC9%FC%2A+%29+&doc=D%3A%2FDDFDOCUMENTS%2FT%2FIP%2FN%2F9
RWAI%2EDOC%2EHTM&curdoc=3&popTitle=1P%2FN%2F9%2FRWA%2FI; see also
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Notification Under
168 [Vol. 16:167
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COMPULSORY ANTI-RETRO VIRAL LICENSING
variously attributed this underutilization to the scheme's burdensomeness and
lack of implementation flexibility,8 the scheme's failure to recognize the need
for economies of scale for exporting countries, 9 political pressure and norm
imposition by the West,'0 failure of antitrust and competition policy," and
inadequate existing market and private investment models of development and
distribution of public goods.12
None of these rationales, however, paints a complete picture of the
shortcomings of the Waiver. The real problem is one of misaligned incentives.
Despite the short-term losses that a compulsory licensing scheme like the
Waiver creates for drug company owners of IP, there are sound long-term
economic incentives for increasing access; today's ARV consumers can
become tomorrow's Lipitor consumers only if they get cheap access to ARVs
in the present. However, the possibility of strategic behavior on the part of
developing nations and third parties, particularly with regard to diversion, has
instead given patent owners the incentive to undermine the Waiver by way of
Free Trade Agreements ("FTAs") and unilateral trade actions. Only by
realigning the incentives of all parties can the Waiver be of any use in solving
the access problem.
Paragraph 2(C) of the Decision of 30 August 2003 on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health - Canada,
IP/N/10/CAN/1 (Oct. 8. 2007), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/
GENhighLightParent.asp?qu=%28+%40meta%5FSymbol+IP%FCN%FCI0%FC%2A+%
29+&doc=D%3A%2FDDFDOCUMENTS%2FT%2FIP%2FN%2FIOCANI%2EDOC%2E
HTM&curdoc=3&popTitle=IP%2FN%2FI0%2FCAN%2Fl.
' See Amir Attaran, Assessing and Answering Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: The Case for Greater Flexibility and a Non-
Justiciability Solution, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 743 (2003); Duncan Matthews, WTO
Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health: A Solution to the Access to Essential Medicines Problem?, 7
J. INT'L EcoN. L. 73, 97 (2004).
9 See Mike Gumbel, Comment, Is Article 31 bis Enough? The Need to Promote
Economies of Scale in the International Compulsory Licensing System, 22 TEMP. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 161 (2008).
'0 See, e.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Biopiracy and Beyond: A Consideration of Socio-Cultural
Conflicts with Global Patent Policies, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 433 (2006); James Thuo
Gathii, The Structural Power of Strong Pharmaceutical Patent Protection in U.S. Foreign
Policy, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 267 (2003),
" See, e.g., Uchi Ewelukwa, Patent Wars in the Valley of the Shadow of Death: The
Pharmaceutical Industry, Ethics, and Global Trade, 59 U. MIAMI L. REv. 203 (2005).
12 See, e.g., Taiwo A. Oriola, Strong Medicine: Patents, Market, and Policy Challenges
for Managing Neglected Diseases and Affordable Prescription Drugs, 7 CAN. J.L. & TECH.
57 (2009); Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private
Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Public Goods, 7 1. INT'L ECON. L. 279
(2004); Jean 0. Lanjouw, Intellectual Property and the Availability of Pharmaceuticals in
Poor Countries, in 3 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 91 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds.
2003); James Love, Developing Drugs for the Developing World: Measures to Enhance
Access to Medical Technologies, and New Methods of Stimulating Medical R & D, 40 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 679 (2007).
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The way forward may lie in realignment of the incentives under the Waiver
regime by promoting co-op licensing treatment. A "co-op" compulsory
licensing approach, emphasizing shared investment, shared work, and shared
participation in future benefits, may be the best hope for altering the cost-
benefit calculus of diversion for all parties involved. Such an approach would
provide short-term remuneration for patent owners while guarding against
diversion and fostering development of local knowledge and industry.
The co-op license notion builds on Kevin Outterson's idea that there is a
need to maximize adaptive research and development to tailor medicines
originally introduced in high income countries to local conditions, so that
medicines may be viable therapies in lower income countries.13  Some
combination of local adaptive R&D (or "local innovation"), financial
participation in the upside of such local innovation, and penalties for diversion
may reduce any locally-perceived need to game the system and may lead to
improved short and long-term outcomes for all parties.
Part II of this Article explores the social and developmental underpinnings
of the access problem and describes the legal framework that provides the
backdrop for the Waiver's licensing scheme. Part III examines the various
lenses, humanitarian, economic, and political, through which the
underutilization problem may be viewed and explained. Part IV sets out the
structural heart of the Waiver scheme's deficiencies: the notion of the
"compulsory" license itself. Part V posits a co-op scheme of licensing that
aligns the concerns, goals, and incentives of IP owners, importers, exporters,
and consumers. Finally, the Article relates the proposed scheme to more
general trends in thinking regarding the deployment of intellectual property
assets.
1I. THE PROBLEM
A. The Social Landscape
The basic social problem is simply stated: the world needs more ARVs and
other essential medicines at reasonable prices. Worldwide, an estimated 33
million people are living with HIV/AIDS, including some 2.7 million people
newly infected in 2007.14 In the developed world, the introduction of anti-
retroviral therapies has improved the prospects for people living with the virus.
By some measures, in countries like the United States, HIV/AIDS has become
a disease that can be managed and lived with, rather than the sure and quick
13 Creation of heat-stable formulations, shelf-stable formulations, and fixed-dose
combinations would be examples of the fruits of such adaptive research. See Kevin
Outterson, Disease-Based Limitations on Compulsory Licenses Under Articles 31 and 31
bis/6 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 09-26, 2009), available at
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/documents/OuttersonKO52009.p
df.
14 UNAIDS, 2008 REPORT ON THE GLOBAL AIDS EPIDEMIC 16 (2008),
http://www.unaids.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/HIVData/GlobalReport/2008/2008_Global rep
ort.asp.
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death sentence it was in the past. By contrast, in developing countries where
ARVs are not widely available, people who contract the disease simply die. A
disproportionate number of the three million people that die from HIV/AIDS
annually live in low-access regions such as sub-Saharan Africa (where some
22 million people have HIV) and Southeast Asia (where the infection rate is
estimated at 2%).'
The terminal nature of the disease when untreated has a particularly jarring
impact on societies with very high infection rates. For example, in Botswana,
where the adult HIV/AIDS infection rate has been estimated at 37%, the
disease has produced in excess of 120,000 orphans in a total population of 1.76
million.16 In Cambodia, life expectancy is estimated to have decreased by four
years due to HIV/AIDS.' 7 Such high infection and mortality rates are bound to
have an impact on family structure, social stability, and economic
development.
B. The Role of Development
According to commentators and participants in the global market for
essential medicines, development is all at once a cause of the access problem, a
partial solution to the problem, and the ultimate prize for finding a solution.
Lack of development limits access, increased development improves access,
and solving public health crises and improving public health outcomes should
lead to long-term economic development.
One of the major obstacles to ARV access is price. The countries where
AIDS/HIV is most devastating tend to be low GDP countries. Market prices
for some therapies exceed US$10,000 per patient per year.' 8  For some
developing countries where the government is the major healthcare provider
for the populace, the aggregate market cost of providing ARVs for all who
need them would represent a multiple of the total national health budget. One
2001 estimate put the theoretical price tag for South Africa to supply its
infected population with market-rate ARVs at US$24-42 billion - one hundred
times South Africa's national public health budget at the time.19
" See id. at 39, 48.
16 Botswana has actually experienced improved access to ARVs in the last few years
relative to its neighbors, but this data gives an idea of the social impact produced by years of
low access. See UNAIDS/WHO, EPIDEMIOLOGICAL FACT SHEETS ON HIV/AIDS AND
SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED INFECTIONS: BOTSWANA 3, 7 (2006), http://apps.who.int/
globalatlas/predefinedReports/EFS2006/EFSPDFs/EFS2006_BW.pdf.
17 Jacqueline Debarats, U.N. Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Population Div. Workshop
on HIV/AIDS and Adult Mortality in Developing Countries, Adult Mortality in the Era of
HIV/AIDS: Asia 6, U.N. Doc. UN/POP/MORT/2003/5 (Aug. 14, 2003), available at
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/adultmort/DESBARATSRev2 Paper5.pdf.
" See AVERT, AIDS, Drug Prices and Generic Drugs, http://www.avert.org/
generic.htm; Mary Beth Walker, Assessing the Barriers to Universal Antiretroviral
Treatment Access for HIV/AIDS in South Africa, 15 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 193, 195
(2004).
'9 This theoretical price tag is arrived at by multiplying the estimated infected South
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Price is not the only problem. As patent owners and their allies are wont to
point out, developing and least-developed countries experience many non-price
related challenges in providing essential medications. Developing countries
may lack the necessary public health infrastructure for transporting and
distributing certain drugs. Clinics and clinicians for diagnosing, prescribing,
and administering medicines may be in short supply. If products require
special handling, like refrigeration, the odds are against infected people in rural
or otherwise isolated communities being able to use them.
Another potential non-price access obstacle is corruption. When the
governments or pharmaceutical companies of rich countries create programs
that give grants, discounts, or free medicines to developing countries, there is a
risk that the program will end up lining the pockets of a public health official,
president, or some other government minister. Shipments of discounted drugs
can disappear from the supply chain and end up being sold on the black
market, not necessarily to the neediest patients. Control over drug aid may
even be used as a weapon by one political, ethnic, or religious faction against
another, reinforcing existing divisions rather than alleviating the public health
crisis for all.
Compounding the logistical and political challenges of getting medicines
into the right hands are the educational and social barriers facing people
seeking treatment in the first place. Local ignorance of a disease and the
therapies for treating it, or local rejection of diagnosis of the disease and its
treatment, can result in suboptimal access regardless of price. For example, in
South Africa, then-president Thabo Mbeki infamously denied the causal link
between the HIV virus and AIDS, created doubt about the effectiveness of the
drug AZT, and derided critics of his HIV/AIDS approach as racists.2 0 Even the
simple act of wearing a condom, which is cheap and readily available in most
countries, is fraught with so much cultural baggage that its role in disease
HIV/AIDS prevention has had to be actively and expensively advocated. 2'
The nexus between economic development and access is not limited to the
African population and the estimated cost of treatment. See ROB DORRINGTON ET AL., MED.
RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE IMPACT OF HIV/AIDS ON ADULT MORTALITY IN SOUTH AFRICA 7
(2001), http://www.mrc.ac.za/bod/complete.pdf (estimates 4.2 million infected South
Africans in 2001); UNAIDS, FACT SHEET, ACCESS TO HIV TREATMENT AND CARE (2003),
http://data.unaids.org/Publications/Fact-Sheets04/fs treatment en.pdf (estimates the cost of
highly active anti-retroviral therapy for one patient for a year to be $10,000 to S12,000).
The annual health budget is estimated for purposes of this comparison at just under S
billion. See Gwen Ramokgopa, Gauteng MEC for Health, Budget Vote Speech 2001/2002
(May 31, 2001), available at http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/200 1/0 105 3 124 5pl 0ol.htm
("It gives me great pleasure to present to the House today and to the Gauteng public, the
Health Budget for the 2001/2002 financial year. Our budget for this year is R6.7 billion [or
US$916 million].").
20 See Mary Beth Walker, Note, Assessing the Barriers to Universal Antiretroviral
Treatment Access for HIVIAIDS in South Africa, 15 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 193, 195-96
(2004).
21 See Monica Chadha, India Fights to Promote Condoms, BBC NEws, July 15, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south-asia/3067325.stm.
[Vol. I6:167172
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theory that low levels of economic development necessitate more access (i.e.,
less IP protection). Without some minimum level of development, questions
of strong versus weak IP protection, or high versus low access, are moot
inquiries. According to one commentator, before adopting strong IP (and low
access) policies, least developed countries must reach a development threshold
that includes a GNP significantly above subsistence level, a significant level of
technical sophistication among the country's scientists and engineers, and a
certain level of internal investment capital. 22
On the other hand, a relaxation of IP protections for some period provides
benefits that promote a developing country's economic growth. Domestic
consumers experience increased welfare and are better off because of the
availability of lower priced versions of the IP asset. Availability of the IP asset
contributes to enhancement of infrastructure and human welfare within the
asset's specific field or industry. The country's foreign exchange picture
improves because of the lack of, or relatively low value of, royalty payments
and repatriation of profits by the multinational owner of the IP. Domestic
entrepreneurs are able to develop enterprises and expertise based on the IP
asset. And the "imitated products" may open up new export markets for the
developing country. 23
Without some differentiation with regard to how markets for a patented drug
are treated, neither access nor the patent system is served. With thoughtful
differentiation, access may serve as a bridge to further economic development
and optimal deployment of patented medicines. 24  The India example is
instructive in this regard. India, which before 2003 provided a lower tier of
protection for pharmaceutical inventions than for inventions in other fields,
saw enormous growth in the value of pharmaceutical products produced and
exported between 1965 and 2001.25 Today, domestic production provides
approximately 70% of the country's needs for pharmaceutical raw materials
and some 80% of its needs for finished pharmaceutical products. 26 If the
connection between access and development can be exploited by IP policy-
makers, then it is possible for the type of technology transfer, investment, and
welfare enhancement to occur that will turn today's access seeker into
tomorrow's producer and exporter of essential medicines.27  Such future
producers will then be more receptive to strong IP and will set the stage for
even greater domestic economic growth.28
22 See Dru Brenner-Beck, Do as I Say, Not as I Did, 11 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 84, 84
(1992).
23 Id. at 100.
24 See generally Lanjouw, supra note 12.
25 Samira Guennif & Julien Chaisse, Present Stakes Around Patent Political Economy:
Legal and Economic Lessons From the Pharmaceutical Patent Rights in India, 2 ASIAN J.
WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 65, 72 (2007).
26 Id.
27 See generally Maskus & Reichman, supra note 12.
21 Reaching the level of development of the richest countries is still associated with a
strong IP regime, despite the benefits of a low IP regime at lower levels of development.
2010] 173
HeinOnline -- 16 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 173 2010
]  ANTI-RETR L  3 
 t t l  l   ic lop ent itate re ess . ., 
 t ti ). t e i   f l e t, stions 
  s   t tion, r i  rsus  ess,  t 
i . i  t  e t t r, f re     
 i ,   i s t  lop ent l  
t s  tly e istence l, i t l f 
i l tication   '  tists  rs,   
t i  l  l t t 1.22 
   ,  l tion  i s  e i   
t  t te  l ing r 's ic t . tic 
rs rience  lfare   r  se   
ilit     i s   l ility   t 
i tes ent  tr ture   re   
'  ific   's  ge  
    , ti ely  ,   
 i tion its  i l  i  
reneurs   rises  tise    
 t ted ts"    rt t   
l i  .23 
t tiation t     ts   
 t ,  s r   .   
r tiation,     i  t 
  t ted .   i    
i  i ,    r i r  
ti n  tical i ti  t  f r i ti s i  t er fiel s, 
  t  tical    
t   .    tion i s 
i t ly '   tical l  
  i l 26   
ti    l t  it   
l   l   
t m    
's    ti l .27  
   i     
r i  28 
22 See Oru Brenner-Beck, o as I Say. ot s I id, II  .   
). 
23 Id.  
24 See generally a j , . 
25 Samira Guennif & Julien haisse, resent t s  t t litical : 
 ti  I . 
  '    'y . 
26  
27 See generally askus  i ,   
28 Reaching the level of develop ent f t  ri t t i  i   i  
   
B. U. J. SC. & TECH. L.
C. The Legal Landscape
Although the non-price factors described above are cited as significant
obstacles to access to medicines, the fact remains that the debate is, for the
most part, defined by price. The high price of ARVs and other essential
medicines is due in part to the fact that these therapies are covered by patents
for which the patent owners typically seek strong protection all over the world.
Patents confer upon their owners a monopolist position with regard to the
patented invention. In the United States, for example, a patent owner has the
right to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering for sale, or
importing the invention. 29  The national laws of any signatory to the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property ("TRIPS") must
include analogous protections, and such laws may not discriminate by field of
invention.30 So, a TRIPS signatory must, in theory, grant a monopoly to the
owner of any patented invention, including an invention in the pharmaceutical
field.3 '
Of course, a monopolist will tend to provide fewer goods at higher prices
than a firm facing competition. Any policies in favor of more monopoly
control for pharmaceutical companies will then necessarily create access
problems relative to policies that introduce low-priced competitive products.
For their part, patent owners argue that without strong patent protection, future
R&D expenditures will be greatly reduced, and long-term outcomes will suffer
for the sake of a purported short-term gain in access. 32 The pharmaceutical
patent holder maintains that society gains more by strengthening the patent
holder's hand than by reducing its control over its inventions. 33
Before 1994, countries with access or other public health issues connected
with patented medicines dealt with them in their own ways. 34 The territoriality
of patents and the relative weakness of existing international agreements
regarding intellectual property left each jurisdiction to its own devices in
solving access problems. Some countries refused to recognize patents for
drugs at all. Some, like India, provided weaker patent protection for drugs
than for other inventions. Local manufacturers were legally allowed to
recreate another's chemical compound in a generic version of the drug, so long
as the generic manufacturer did not copy the branded manufacturer's process
For a discussion of the theoretical link between strong trademark protection and product
launches and development, see Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Challenges for
Developing Countries: An Economic Perspective, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 457, 461 (2001).
29 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(a) (2006).
30 See Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 27, 33
1.L.M. 81 (1994).
31 Id.
n See generally PhRMA, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, http://www.phrma.org/node/38 (last
visited Mar. 22, 2010).
33 Id.
34 See DORIS ESTELLE LONG & ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY 126 (West Group 2000).
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for creating the drug.35 Other nations, like Brazil, loudly proclaimed their right
to impose compulsory licenses for patented drugs, especially where the owner
of the drug had opted not to produce the drug locally for domestic supply. A
compulsory license would be awarded to a local manufacturer, and a
reasonable royalty, set by the government, would be remitted to the patent
owner.36
TRIPS, negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round of trade talks that led to the
creation of the World Trade Organization (the "WTO"), has severely
weakened the ability of national governments to develop their own solutions to
the access problem. Admission into the WTO, and the concomitant ability to
take advantage of favorable trade treatment by the 138 other members, was
conditioned on also acceding to TRIPS.37 This requirement created potential
problems for some of the most active access problem-solvers. Article 27 of
TRIPS did away with the practice of discriminating against patented inventions
based on field of technology, and thus limited the ability of countries to deny
protection to pharmaceutical inventions. 38 Article 30 limited any exceptions to
patent rights to those that "do not unreasonably conflict with a normal
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third
parties."39 Article 31 weakened compulsory licensing as an access tool by,
among other things, requiring negotiations with the patent holder before
issuing a compulsory license, limiting the scope and duration of uses under
compulsory license, and limiting compulsory licensing to use in supplying the
domestic (non-export) market. 40
Although TRIPS allowed compulsory licensing to be used to address issues
of public health, signatories were confused as to under what circumstances
they would be justified in issuing such licenses. In 2001, South Africa's
attempt to grant its Health Minister the power to issue compulsory licenses,
weaken patent protection, and allow parallel imports of medicines in order to
protect public health was challenged by the local affiliate of the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, the pharmaceutical industry's main
trade group.4 1 In June of that year, the United States commenced WTO dispute
settlement proceedings against Brazil for its attempt to grant compulsory
3 For a detailed treatment of the history of pharmaceutical patent protection in India, see
Guennif & Chaisse, supra note 25, at 68-73.
36 For a detailed treatment of Brazil's history of use of compulsory licensing in
expanding access, see Ubirajara Regis Quintanilha Marques, Valeska Santos Guimaries &
Caitlin Sternberg, Brazil's AIDS Controversy: Antiretroviral Drugs, Breaking Patents, and
Compulsory Licensing, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 471, 473-76 (2005).
3 See HOLGER HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE CASE OF PATENTS
AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES xxxiv (Oxford Univ. Press 2007).
31 See Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 27, 33
1.L.M. 81 (1994).
3 Id. at art. 30.
40 See id. at art. 31.
41 See Matthews, supra note 8, at 78-79.
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licenses where a patented product was not manufactured locally. 42
Finally, in November 2001, after negotiations at Doha, Qatar, the WTO
affirmed the right of nations to prioritize access to medicines over protection of
IP rights, and supported use of the "legitimate interests of third parties"
language of Article 30 as a basis for allowing compulsory licensing of patented
drugs. The "Doha Declaration" also extended the deadline for the least-
developed WTO members to become TRIPS-compliant until 2016.43 What the
Declaration did not definitively do, however, was address the ability of a
country to produce generic versions of patented medicines for export to
countries that need the drug but lack manufacturing capacity. In 2003, the
WTO ostensibly cured that failing by issuing its Decision on Implementation
of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration.44 The decision, which this author has
called the Health Flexibility Waiver, temporarily allowed countries to trade in
medicines manufactured under compulsory license. In December 2005, the
WTO made the Health Flexibility Waiver permanent by amending the TRIPS
agreement. 45
Ill. DISPARATE VIEWS OF THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE
Compounding the complexity of seeking an access solution, given the
difficult social, economic, and legal terrain to be navigated, the view of the
terrain is not necessarily shared by all. This Section discusses the various and
disparate lenses through which observers of the access situation perceive the
problem.
A. The Humanitarian Lens
Viewed through a humanitarian lens, access to life-saving therapies,
including ARVs, is arguably a key element of the fundamental human right of
enjoyment by everyone in the world of the "highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health."46 The Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights has expressed the need to move beyond a purely commercial
view of treatment of disease and embrace an approach that creates incentives
42 See id. at 80.
4 See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, %f 4-6,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755, 755-56 (2002).
4 See Decision of the General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Aug. 30, 2003)
[hereinafter Doha Declaration].
'5 See Decision of the General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641
(Dec. 6, 2005). The time set to ratify the Amendment by two-thirds of WTO members was
Dec. 1, 2007, but has since been extended until Dec. 31, 2009. At the time of this article,
the Amendment has not yet been ratified.
46 Intemational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200
(XXI), at 51, art. 12, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966). See also Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 76, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Ist plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) (setting forth a standard of living adequate for health and well-being
of the family as a fundamental human right).
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to broaden access to medicines and fosters research into "unprofitable"
neglected diseases. 47
The pure humanitarian perspective would tend to push states and
supranational institutions toward non-market or extra-market solutions that
limit the control that the owners of the drugs exercise over price and supply,
and perhaps to shift more of that control to national governments. For
example, Professor Taiwo Oriola has advocated placing a "social lien" on
medicines developed from publicly funded research. Such a lien would create
a moral obligation on the part of the patent owner to facilitate access to the
patented drug.48  Arguments regarding development costs and protecting
incentives to innovate hold little sway over proponents of this view, in part
because research costs are so often subsidized by the state, and in part because
non-research costs, such as marketing and advertising, are argued to add
significantly to the total "overhead" claimed by patent owners in justifying
high drug prices. 49
Given a choice between protecting human life and protecting patent rights,
proponents of this approach would nearly always choose expanding access to
support human life and health. Arguments about the cost of drug development
are unavailing, and greed or misplaced priorities provide a too easy
explanation for the resistance of patent owners to strong implementation of
human rights-based access initiatives.
B. The Market Fundamentalist Lens
If the access problem is viewed through the lens of market fundamentalism,
the set of possible solutions looks very different. Under this view, the only
way to persuade inventors of medicines to spend their time inventing is to
reward them with a period of exclusivity/monopoly over the production and
distribution of their invention. Upon expiration of the exclusivity period, the
invention enters the public domain and society as a whole is enriched.
Research and development is a costly endeavor with uncertain outcomes, and
no rational actor would engage in such activity if it could not exert control over
the resulting product later on. Free riders kill the incentive to innovate, and
only by reducing or eliminating the rents captured by free riders will we allow
creators and creative enterprise to flourish.50 Encouraging strong patent rights
47 Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, Submission to the 5th WTO Ministerial
Conference Cancun, Mexico, 10-14 September 2003: Human Rights and Trade, at 7-8 (Sept.
2003), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/globalization/trade/
docs/5WTOMinisterialCancun.pdf
48 Oriola, supra note 12, at 78.
49 Id at 59-61, 90-92. See also Gail E. Evans, Strategic Patent Licensing for Public
Research Organizations: Deploying Restriction and Reservation Clauses to Promote
Medical R&D in Developing Countries, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 175, 194 (citing "declining
R&D productivity, rising costs of commercialization, increasing payor influence, and
shorter exclusivity periods" as factors in the increasing cost to launch a new drug product).
50 See Thomas F. Cotter, Market Fundamentalism and the TRIPS Agreement, 22
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 307, 323-24 (2004).
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across the globe, even in developing countries, supports the protection of
innovators against free riders because such encouragement eliminates the
collective action problem that might lead individual countries to weaken their
patent laws for short term advantage.5' Allowing any opportunities to opt out
of strong patent protection under TRIPS would lead to fewer patented
inventions overall.
Complicating the research incentives question is the fact that, under the
current pharmaceutical research paradigm, most drug development is financed
by large, publicly traded companies; and such companies are, for the most part,
the owners of the patents at issue in the access debate. As for-profit
enterprises, they cannot ignore the impact of access decisions on revenues and
profits, at least not if they expect to continue in business for the long term. As
corporations, they are further constrained by the fiduciary duties of their
managers to make decisions that benefit their shareholders.52 So, although
there may be room to balance profit maximization and access, and although the
managers, officers, and directors of patent owners may desire to implement
access solutions, there will always be a structural drag on their ability to do so.
When the problem is viewed through this lens, solutions should err on the
side of protecting the rights of patent owners. Alan Sykes has advocated
limiting compulsory licensing by narrowly construing the occurrence of a
"national emergency" under TRIPS, by encouraging lengthy negotiations over
licensing arrangements, and by tying the "adequate remuneration" concept of
TRIPS Article 31 to actual R&D costs incurred by the patent holder (for both
successful and unsuccessful research directed at the same disease).5 After all,
only if the patent owner receives the right incentives to develop drugs in the
short term will it continue to devote resources to R&D in the future; and only
then will we have more life-saving drugs in the long term. 54
The patent owners are benefiting the public in the long run via continued
introduction to the market of new technology, and restrictions of patent rights
carry the risk of diminishing the value of such technology, maybe even to zero.
Therefore, derogations of patents should be limited even as access is pursued
in the short term.55 Better to allow the patent owner to provide solutions that
maintain its control over price and distribution and preserve its incentives to
innovate, than to allow governments to develop their own rules for access.
Solutions that flow from this approach include donations, patient assistance
programs, and negotiated low-cost sales to national governments in poor
countries, all without disturbing the basic monopoly framework of patent
rights. Preserving the patent system, proponents argue, presents the best hope
for promoting access and alleviating public health crises, because preserving
" Id. at 325 (citing Sykes, supra note 3, at 65-66).
52 See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Patent Law - Balancing Profit Maximization and
Public Access to Technology, 4 COLuM. SC. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 29 (2002), available at
http://www.stlr.org/html/volume4/beckerman.pdf.
" Sykes, supra note 3, at 67-68.
54 See id. at 68.
s See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 52, at 30.
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COMPULSORY ANTI-RETRO VIRAL LICENSING
the patent system also preserves the research and development that has
produced the current set of essential medicines and will produce the essential
medicines of the future. 56
C. The Political Lens
Viewed as a political problem, access is complicated by power asymmetries
among the sovereign players in the WT0 57 and by increased participation by
life sciences companies in policymaking.58 The increased macroeconomic
importance of knowledge-intensive industries, such as computer technology
and pharmaceuticals, has enhanced the political influence of those industries. 59
As one commentator notes, these companies are well-resourced and organized;
they contribute so mightily to their states' trade balances that their interests are
highly integrated with those of the state.60
The policies pursued by states where the pharmaceutical industry wields
great influence have followed a predictable path. The United States and
European Union pushed for adoption of the TRIPS agreement, establishing
minimum standards of intellectual property protection (including patent
protection for medicines) and enticing developing countries to abandon pro-
access policies with the promise of full membership in the club of important
trade partners, the World Trade Organization. The United States supplemented
the carrot of WTO membership with the stick of unilateral trade sanctions in
convincing developing countries to adopt the strong IP provisions of TRIPS.6 1
Post-TRIPS, the Health Flexibility Waiver notwithstanding, the owners of
patented drugs have insisted upon, and gotten, even stronger intellectual
property protection to the detriment of access interests. In seeking to increase
access, the Waiver essentially provides a way around patent rights. But the
West has insisted that a number of countries subject themselves to restrictions
with respect to other types of intangible property, not squarely treated by the
Waiver mechanism (so-called "TRIPS-Plus" policies). 62 For example, the
United States has been aggressive in negotiating bilateral and regional free
trade agreements ("FTAs") that place such heavy IP burdens on signatories as
to preclude their participation in a compulsory licensing scheme, including the
ss Id.
* The effects of political pressure were predicted from the time of the Decision. See
Ewelukwa, supra note 11, at 207 (promising "covert threats of economic sanctions" for
countries who might think of using the Waiver).
" See Susan K. Sell, The Quest for Global Governance in Intellectual Property and
Public Health: Structural, Discursive, and Institutional Dimensions, 77 TEMP. L. REv. 363,
364 (2004).
' See id at 368.
60 See id.
6' See Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data Exclusivity
and Patent/Registration Linkage, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 303, 313 (2008) (citing use by the
United States Trade Representative of its Special 301 Watch List powers under 19 U.S.C. §
2242 (2006)).
62 See HESTERMEYER, supra note 37, at 289-90.
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one created by the Waiver.63 The anti-access provisions of these agreements
fall into three categories. The first is IP protection for test data. For at least
five years, a generic manufacturer may not use test data or other proprietary
information that the patent owner has submitted to the relevant government for
the purposes of receiving regulatory approval to market the drug.64 In effect,
this sort of restriction makes it difficult for a generic manufacturer to bring a
generic version of a patented drug to market without conducting a full set of
clinical trials and generating its own test data. Such an endeavor would be
costly (for an industry with very thin profit margins) and lengthy (delaying the
ability of patients to get access to the generic drug by years). As a practical
matter, the prohibition of the use of test data erects a barrier to use of the
Waiver and limits access despite the fact that relaxation of patent requirements
should be access-promoting.
The second type of access-limiting provision in free trade agreements is
often called a "patent/registration linkage" provision.65  Such a provision
essentially deputizes a signatory's food and drug regulatory authority as a
patent infringement enforcement agent. The regulatory approval of any
generic drug is delayed during the term of the relevant patent, unless
authorization is obtained from the patent owner. 66 So, even if a generic meets
63 Id. at 290.
' See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement, U.S.- Austi., art. 17.10 §1, May 18, 2004, 43 1.L.M.
1248, available at http://tcc.export.gov/static/AFTA.full text.pdf [hereinafter U.S. - Austl.
FTA]; Free Trade Agreement, U.S. - Bahr., art. 14.9 §1, Sept. 14, 2004, 44 1.L.M. 544,
available at http://tcc.export.gov/static/TAA.BahrainFTAChapterl4.pdf [hereinafter U.S. -
Bahr. FTA]; Free Trade Agreement, U.S. - Chile, art. 17.10 §1, June 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M.
1026, available at http://tcc.export.gov/static/17.ipr.pdf [hereinafter U.S. - Chile FTA];
Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S. - Colom., art. 16.10 §2(a), Nov. 22, 2006, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm send/1336 [hereinafter U.S. - Colom. FTA]; KORUS Free
Trade Agreement, U.S. - S. Korea, art. 18.9 §1, Apr. 1, 2007, 46 1.L.M. 642, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/korus/asset uploadfile273_1
2717.pdf [hereinafter KORUS FTA]; Free Trade Agreement, U.S.- Morocco, art. 15.10 §1,
Jan. I, 2006, 44 1.L.M. 544, available at http://tcc.export.gov/static/
asset uploadfile797_3849.pdf [hereinafter U.S. - Morocco FTA]; Free Trade Agreement,
U.S. - Oman, art. 15.9 § 1, Jan. 19, 2006, available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/
uploads/agreements/fta/oman/asset uploadfile715_8809.pdf [hereinafter U.S. - Oman
FTA]; Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S. - Pan., art. 15.10 §2(a), June 28, 2007, available
at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/panamal
assetupload filel3 1 10350.pdf [hereinafter U.S. - Pan. FTA]; Trade Promotion
Agreement, U.S. - Peru, art. 16.10 §2(a), Apr. 12, 2006, available at http://www.ustr.gov/
webfm_send/1031 [hereinafter U.S. - Peru FTA]; Free Trade Agreement, U.S. - Sing., art.
16.8 §1, May 6, 2003, 42 1.L.M. 1026, available at http://tcc.export.gov/static/text final.pdf
[hereinafter U.S. - Sing. FTA]; CAFTA Free Trade Agreement, art. 15.10 § 1, Aug. 5, 2004,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/caftal
assetupload file934_3935.pdf [hereinafter CAFTA] (CAFTA includes U.S., Costa Rica,
Dom. Rep., El Sal., Guat., Hond., Nicar.).
65 Baker, supra note 61, at 307.
66 See, e.g., U.S. - Austl. FTA, supra note 64, §4; U.S. - Bahr. FTA, supra note 64, §2;
U.S. - Chile FTA, supra note 64, §2; U.S. - Colom. FTA, supra note 64, §2(b); KORUS
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the agency's approval criteria to be marketed in the relevant country,
distribution of the drug could be delayed due to the existence of a patent for the
drug. Although the Waiver is supposed to provide a way around patents, it
does not address such linkages and thus presents an anti-access loophole for
pharmaceutical companies and their governments.
The third category of access-limiting provision in a typical U.S. free trade
agreement is the limitation on the grounds for revoking a patent. This sort of
provision limits the grounds for revocation of a patent to those grounds that
could have been cited in denying the patent in the first place.67 One
interpretation of such a provision is that a patent subject to an FTA may only
be revoked for fraud or for lack of novelty, utility/industrial application, or
nonobviousness/inventive step. Reasons having to do with access, such as
unreasonable pricing, failure to market, etc., do not seem to be available to
FTA signatories. 6 8
Beyond the access-limiting free trade agreements to which the U.S. has
become a party, the United States Trade Representative ("USTR") has a
history of threatening unilateral sanctions against nations who engage in
compulsory licensing. 69 Despite USTR "side letters" that ostensibly reassure
signatories that they may take steps to protect public health, potential importers
and exporters under the Waiver scheme are treading carefully in the face of
threats from such an important trading partner.70 The access-limiting power
dynamic between rich and poor countries has also tainted several laudable
humanitarian gestures in the eyes of some observers, further complicating
attempts to bridge the divide." As one commentator put it, the totality of
rights and obligations actually practiced by TRIPS signatories "represent the
codification of political tradeoffs masquerading as positivist obligations
FTA, supra note 64, §2; U.S. - Morocco FTA, supra note 64, §4; U.S. - Oman FTA, supra
note 64, §2; U.S. - Pan. FTA, supra note 64, §2(b); U.S. - Peru FTA, supra note 64, §2(b);
U.S. - Sing. FTA, supra note 64, §4; CAFTA, supra note 64, §2.
67 See, e.g., U.S. - Austl. FTA, supra note 64, art. 17.9 §5; U.S. - Bahr. FTA, supra note
64, art. 14.8 §4; U.S. - Chile FTA, supra note 64, art. 17.9 §5; U.S. - Colom. FTA, supra
note 64, 16.9 §4; KORUS FTA, supra note 64, art. 18.8 §4; U.S. - Morocco FTA, supra
note 64, art. 15.9 §5; U.S. - Oman FTA, supra note 64, art. 15.8 §4; U.S. - Pan. FTA, supra
note 64, art. 15.9 §4; U.S. - Peru FTA, supra note 64, art. 16.9 §4; U.S. - Sing. FTA, supra
note 64, art. 16.7 §4; CAFTA, supra note 64, art. 15.9 §4.
6 See, e.g., HESTERMEYER, supra note 37, at 290.
69 Thailand, South Africa, Brazil, India, and Argentina have been at the receiving end of
such threats. See Baker, supra note 61, at 317.
70 Id. at 331-32.
71 See Gathii, supra note 10, at 268; Michelle M. Nerozzi, The Battle Over Life-Saving
Pharmaceuticals: Are Developing Countries Being "TRIPped" by Developed Countries?,
47 VILL. L. REv. 605, 631 nn.l 19-120 (citing strings attached to Pfizer's donation program
for the HIV/AIDS drug Fluconazole (Diflucan)). See also Barbara Crossette, AIDS Fungus
Drug Offered to Poor Nations, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 200 1, at A3; AIDS Story: Part 2, THE
GUARDIAN (UK), Dec. 2, 2000, at 13, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2000/
dec/02/aids.weekend7.
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imposed by law." 72
IV. RECALIBRATING THE LENSES
The views described supra are more often than not at odds with each other
and indicate a problem that is not even simply stated, let alone solved. A view
of the access problem that will ultimately lead to a solution, however, must
acknowledge some shortcomings on all fronts. First, the market
fundamentalist argument tends to ignore a responsibility on the part of
pharmaceutical patent owners to the global human community. Given the
enormous profits earned by multinational pharmaceutical companies in the
developed world, some of which are financed publicly, aggressive expansion
of access in the developing world, even at the cost of some of those profits,
does not seem too much to ask. Pharmaceutical company profits have been
described in economic terms as supra-optimal rents and should be able to
absorb the cost of monitoring and enforcing an access scheme without harming
innovation.73
The sense of responsibility should be heightened by the fact that low-access
nations are not a plausible source of market-rate sales for the therapies in
question. 74 So there are few, if any, lost sales attributable to humanitarian
solutions. Further, for every day that the access problem is not solved, there is
both a current cost in human lives and a future cost in the value of the local
market. If a country is destabilized by catastrophic diseases like HIV/AIDS or
malaria, its economy will never mature into a viable market for the
pharmaceutical industry's chronic care therapies and lifestyle drugs.
Ultimately, global growth depends on solving the access problem in the short
term.
On the other hand, minimizing certain other realities of the market, as some
proponents of the pure humanitarian view do, may place the long-term access
effort in jeopardy. Unfortunately, access solutions that reduce control over
price and supply may have a negative impact on the patent owner's long-term
financial viability. For example, losing control over supply often means that a
patent owner cannot prevent trade in parallel imports, or gray market goods. If
medicines are diverted from a low price market to a high price market, the
patent owner will lose expected sales in the high price market, and shareholder
value may suffer.75  Any sort of differential pricing creates an attractive
2 Ruth L.Okediji, The International Relations of Intellectual Property: Narratives of
Developing Country Participation in the Global Intellectual Property System, 7 SING. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 315, 339 (2003).
1 See Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in
International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 193, 223
(2005).
74 For example, the average annual price of a first-line ARV in the United States is
S7,215 per capita. One drug, Fuzeon, costs S20,000 annually. Id at 251; see also Lanjouw,
supra note 12, at 100, 104.
" It has also been argued that differential pricing to enhance access can lead to the
expectation of lower list prices in developed markets, which would also impact the profit
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arbitrage opportunity. Local prices in the importing country are low, prices in
other markets (including the European Union and the United States) may be
much higher, and as long as transportation and other transactions costs are
sufficiently low, some entrepreneur can be expected to take advantage of the
opportunity to engage in parallel trade with the drugs at issue.
The prevalence and effect of parallel trade are in dispute. The incentive to
engage in gray market sales of drugs lies not with consumers, patent owners, or
governments, but with other actors who interact with the distribution chain,
such as local manufacturers, distributors/transport agents, or individual
government officials. 76 Diversion diminishes local supply and may lead to
higher local prices and decreased welfare for the consumers in need of the
medicine.77 On the other hand, documented cases of major diversion are hard
to come by, minor diversion is fairly easily absorbed, and techniques exist for
thwarting any attempt at large-scale diversion.78 Whatever diversion does
exist, however, potentially circumvents the industry's efforts to maintain drug
quality and safety in its distribution chain. 79 So, even a small amount of
diversion could lead to social welfare losses. Given the uncertainty involved,
even if they don't go quite so far rhetorically, it should not be surprising for
executives and managers of patent owners to reject any solution that adds
volatility to a pharmaceutical company's profit calculus. Such volatility is sure
to lead to access-limiting behavior on the part of managers. Any access
solution that expects not to be undermined by pharmaceutical patent owners
must acknowledge and deal with the risk of diversion.
The TRIPS solution to the parallel import issue focuses on the physical
characteristics of the product. The August 30 Decision requires that:
(i) only the amount necessary to meet the needs of the eligible importing
Member(s) may be manufactured under the licence and the entirety of this
production shall be exported to the Member(s) which has notified its
needs to the Council for TRIPS;
(ii) products produced under the licence shall be clearly identified as
being produced under the system set out in this Decision through specific
calculus of the patent owner. See Cotter, supra note 50, at 338.
7 See Harvey E. Bale, Jr., The Conflicts Between Parallel Trade and Product Access and
Innovation: The Case of Pharmaceuticals, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 637, 638 (1998).
n Id. at 648.
78 See Outterson, supra note 73, at 261-67, (detailing the lack of documented diversion
cases and distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable parallel trade); Lanjouw, supra note
12, at 110 (describing policy tools for dealing with diversion risk, including export controls,
distribution chain monitoring, distinctive pill design, and distinctive packaging); Sloan
Pearson, Will the August 20, 2003 Decision of the WTO Provide Adequate Protection for
Patent Holders Rights and is Diversion Still a Threat to the Pharmaceutical Industry?, 5 J.
HIGH TECH. L. 381, 396 (2005) (providing examples of physical differentiation between
market pharmaceutical products and their donated versions).
7 See Claude E. Barfield & Mark A. Groombridge, Parallel Trade in the
Pharmaceutical Industry: Implications for Innovation, Consumer Welfare, and Health
Policy, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. LJ. 185, 254 (1999).
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labelling or marking. Suppliers should distinguish such products through
special packaging and/or special colouring/shaping of the products
themselves, provided that such distinction is feasible and does not have a
significant impact on price; and
(iii) before shipment begins, the licensee shall post on a website the
following information:
- the quantities being supplied to each destination as referred to in
indent (i) above; and
- the distinguishing features of the product(s) referred to in indent (ii)
above.80
The General Council Chairperson's Statement regarding the Decision further
outlines best practices with respect to diversion; again, these best practices
focus mainly on physical characteristics of the pills and packaging being
produced.8'
While rendering the products produced under the waiver easily identifiable
is an important piece of the solution to the diversion problem, it is only a piece.
Distinctive coloring, packaging, labeling, and other trade dress do little to
dissuade traffic that is not necessarily conducted in full view of all the
interested parties. A more robust set of solutions should focus on the
compulsory license, and the incentives that it creates. The role of the
compulsory license is often misunderstood, 82 and some discussion of its actual
role and import is warranted.
Generally, in practice, compulsory licensing is very rare.83 This is despite
the existence of many laws (including Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration)
allowing such licensing. For at least some countries, not engaging in
compulsory licensing may be a matter of "face" or reputation.8 4 Face-saving
non-utilization of compulsory licensing validates early predictions that the
Waiver system would not alone increase access, and that it was more important
as a political statement than as a serviceable licensing scheme.85 There is little
guidance as to the substance of the compulsory license, that is, what it should
80 Doha Declaration, supra note 44, at §2(b).
81 See General Council, General Council Chairperson's Statement, WT/GC/M/82 (Nov.
13, 2003), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratopE/TRIPSe/
gcstat_30aug03_e.htm.
82 See Arnoldo Lacayo, Comment, Seeking a Balance: International Pharmaceutical
Patent Protection, Public Health Crises, and the Emerging Threat of Bio-Terrorism, 33 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 295, 317 (2002); Cotter, supra note 50, at 324; Marques, supra
note 36, at 474; Christine A. Chung, Note, A Cry for Cheap Drugs: CAFTA's Inflexible
Intellectual Property Protections Create an Ominous Impact on Life-Saving Medicines, 13
Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 171, 182 (2006), Sykes, supra note 3, at 55.
83 See Attaran, supra note 8, at 746-47 & n.7 (arguing that for most of the decade
preceding 2003, almost no country compulsorily licensed "finished medicines on an
extensive scale").
84 Id. at 750.
85 See Scott Lucyk, Patents, Politics and Public Health: Access to Essential Medicines
Under the TRIPS Agreement, 38 OTEAAWA L. REV. 191, 194 (2006-07).
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COMPULSORY ANTI-RETROVIRAL LICENSING
actually say. Uncertainty about license terms, including what constitutes
"adequate remuneration," may be a hindrance to compulsory licenses in
general, not only under the Waiver scheme.86 In the face of diversion and
arbitrage risk, it is dismaying, but not surprising, that IP-exporting countries
have imposed TRIPS-plus provisions that discourage use of the Waiver. There
is no assurance that any licenses coming out of the Waiver scheme would
approximate anything that an IP owner would want out of a licensing
arrangement.87 There remains too much opportunity for strategic behavior on
the part of others (governments, third parties) and not enough recourse to de-
incentivize such behavior. The main use of compulsory licensing laws and
schemes seems to be as a lever to influence price negotiations on patented
drugs. Brazil has been so successful at this negotiating tactic that other
countries are adopting it as an access tool.88
Several commentators have examined the license, mainly by focusing on
streamlining the process, rather than adopting particular substantive terms.
Amir Attaran proposes a "non-justiciability" solution to the access problem,
excusing manufacture under compulsory license under certain conditions.89
The manufacturing country would be shielded from WTO dispute resolution
proceedings under the Attaran proposal, provided the parties to the license
meet any of three criteria: (1) the importing country has a per capita income of
$2,935 or less, (2) the importing country has "an adult HIV seroprevalence of
one percent or greater," or (3) the importing country faces an "acute public
health emergency." 90  As the actual use of compulsory licenses is
circumscribed in the first place, Attaran argues that non-justiciability based on
objective criteria highlights the limited downside of Paragraph 6 and makes it
more palatable to patent owners and their governments. 9 1
Frederick Abbott and Jerome Reichman have advocated a "pooled"
licensing approach to address the unresolved public action problem at the heart
of the access issue.92 Under such a scheme, a number of countries could pool
compulsory licenses in order to promote economies of scale in manufacturing
and procurement, decreasing costs and increasing purchasing power/leverage
86 See Antony Taubman, Rethinking TRIPS: 'Adequate Remuneration' for Non-
Voluntary Patent Licensing, 1 IJ. INT'L ECON. L. 927, 932 (2008).
" In a negotiated, market-driven license, key terms might include term/duration of
license; defined royalty or royalty calculation; scope of licensed technology and of territory;
requirements regarding sales and royalty records, reporting, and inspection; default,
termination, and acceleration provisions; and representations and warranties of the parties.
8 See Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory Licensing on Foreign
Direct Investment: A Collective Bargaining Approach, 45 AM. Bus. LJ. 283, 316 (2008).
89 Attaran, supra note 8, at 769.
9o Id. at 760-64.
9' See id. at 743-44.
9 Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round's Public Health
Legacy: Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the
Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L. 921, 921-22 (2007).
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with both originator drug companies and generic producers.93
Amir Khoury proffers an enhanced compulsory licensing model, calling for
retroactive compensation for patent owners, avoiding production slowdowns
and enabling exporting and importing nations to act quickly. 94 Royalties
would be paid to patent owners only if it was proved ex post that the
compulsory license was employed without justification under TRIPS. Further,
if the importing state made no profit on the distribution of the drug, no royalty
would be owed. The term of the license would be limited, the World Health
Organization would participate in the settlement of disputes, and data
exclusivity provisions of TRIPS-plus agreements would be relaxed. 95 Robert
Bird and Daniel Cahoy suggest a regionally coordinated license akin to the
pooled license strategy discussed supra. Regional trade associations, rather
than individual nations, could issue the license and bargain collectively over its
terms. The incentive to launch such a scheme is greatly diminished by the
TRIPS-plus tactics of the West, as Bird and Cahoy observe.96
V. A MODEL FOR A CO-OP LICENSING SCHEME
Although the debate is not often framed in these terms, the access
conundrum stems in part from the desire of multiple interdependent actors to
maximize their welfare, all the while taking into account the likely actions of
competing wealth-maximizers in the same system. Game theory represents a
useful tool for analyzing the parties' incentives and ways in which re-
alignment of such incentives may yield more socially desirable outcomes. 97
Problems of intellectual property, international trade, and international
relations have proven amenable to game theoretic treatment; and the access
problem, which combines elements of all three disciplines, is ripe for such
analysis.98
This Article is particularly interested in applications of non-cooperative
game theory, in which the player's only concern is maximizing its own
individual payoffs within the parameters of the game. 99 Behavior that could be
9 See id. at 973-74.
94 Amir H. Khoury, The "Public Health" of the Conventional International Patent
Regime & the Ethics of "Ethicals:" Access to Patented Medicines, 26 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 25, 59 (2008).
95 See id at 58-63.
96 See Bird & Cahoy, supra note 88, at 328.
97 Game theory has been described as seeking to "explore how people make decisions if
their actions and fates depend on the actions of others." Note, Finding Strategic Corporate
Citizenship: A New Game Theoretic View, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1957, 1959 (2004) (quoting
PETER C. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION Xii
(1986)).
98 See, e.g., Bird & Cahoy, supra note 88, at 321-28; Chris J. Katopis, Perfect
Happiness?: Game Theory as a Tool for Enhancing Patent Quality, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH.
360 (2007-08); Horace E. Anderson, Jr., The Privacy Gambit: Toward a Game Theoretic
Approach to International Data Protection, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 28 (2006).
99 See DAVID M. KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELLING 9 (1990).
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COMPULSORY ANTI-RETRO VIRAL LICENSING
labeled "cooperative" or "collaborative" generally comes about under such a
regime if the behavior serves the best individual interests of the actors. 00 A
primary tool in analyzing non-cooperative situations is the normal form, or
strategic form game. One version of the normal form game is the well-known
Prisoner's Dilemma. In the normal form game, the players move
simultaneously and without knowledge of the other player's choice of move.
Three key elements make up the normal form game: (1) the players, (2) the
strategies available to them, and (3) the payoff to each player for each
combination of player strategies.' 0'
David Kreps illustrates a typical embodiment of a normal form game in
matrix format using the children's game Rock-Paper-Scissors to outline
strategies and payoffs. Assuming two children, Alan and Beth, each with a
strategy set (Throw Rock, Throw Paper, or Throw Scissors), and each standing
to win a point if favored by the combination, lose a point if disfavored by the
combination, or stand pat if the combination is a draw. The payoffs from a
Rock-Paper-Scissors game can be modeled as follows (in each set of payoffs,
Alan's payoff appears before the comma, and Beth's payoff appears after the
comma):102
Figure A
Beth
Rock Paper Scissors
Rock 0,0 -1,1 1,-1
Paper 1,-1 0,0 -1,1
Scissors -1,1 1,-1 0,0
A game may be "solved" by deducing which strategies players are likely to
adopt, given the potential payoff to the player and given what that player
knows about the other player's goals, available strategies, and payoffs. 0 3 The
players can be expected to gravitate toward strategies that deliver them higher
payoffs, and the solution concepts of non-cooperative game theory proceed
under that assumption.104
A normal form game model of the Health Flexibility Waiver system might
include three players, a Patent Owner ("PO"), a country taking advantage of
the Waiver ("Waiver Country" or "WC"), and a Distributor/Diverter ("D").
For purposes of this model, we assume that the players' available strategies are
10o Id.
1o See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT GERTNER & RANDAL PICKER, GAME THEORY AND
THE LAW 8 (1994).
'02 See KREPS, supra note 99, at 10-11.
103 See id
Although much has been made of the failure of the rationality assumption in
economic theory, this Article assumes that, regardless of whether possession of dollars or
widgets is important to a particular person, that person has some capacity for making
decisions that are consistent with his tastes and goals.
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as follows: WC may choose License or Forego, that is, issue a compulsory
license under the Waiver or forego issuance of a compulsory license, relying
on the market and the largesse of PO to meet its people's needs. D may choose
Divert or Refrain, either choosing to divert medicines manufactured under the
license to the gray market or leaving the distribution chain undisturbed.
Although PO does not play in the first iteration of this game, its strategy
choices in a later iteration will be Introduce or Withhold, that is, either
introduce its drug in WC's local market, or decline to do so.
Precise payoffs for each of the strategies in the game are difficult to
calculate, but we can posit the components of each player's expected result.
WC's payoff in the License/Forego strategy decision will depend on current
revenues from the license (either direct revenues or taxes on the revenues of
the compulsory licensee), current cost of licensing (including royalties paid to
PO), current costs of manufacturing and distribution, current costs of local
innovation (adaptive know-how associated with optimizing formulation and
delivery systems for local conditions), future public health and development
gains from stabilizing the situation with regard to the relevant disease, and
potential cost of retaliation by PO (or its government) in the event of diversion
or other disrespect of PO's patent rights.
The payoff from D's strategy choice of Divert versus Refrain will depend on
potential current revenues from diversion to the gray market, any current direct
costs associated with the diversion (including transportation and other
transaction costs), the opportunity cost of engaging in pharmaceutical
diversion rather than other economic activity, the cost incurred if its activities
are detected (including fines or imprisonment, depending on local law), and the
likelihood of detection (including the inclination of WC toward detection and
the resources available for detection-related activities).
Although PO does not play in this game's first iteration, we will describe
here the components of its payoff, because it will receive payoffs based on the
moves of the other two players even if it does not move. PO's payoff might be
comprised of current revenues (from regular sales or from royalties relating to
a licensee's manufacture of PO's drug under compulsory license), lost sales in
the event of diversion (in the instant market and in foreign markets), current
cost savings from reduction or elimination of its own local supply chain, future
revenues in the local market, and future benefits of local innovation (adaptive
know-how associated with optimizing formulation and delivery systems for
local conditions).
For purposes of this game, in the event of a License decision, we posit
current revenues for WC of 10, a licensing cost (including royalty paid) of 3,
manufacturing and distribution cost (including the cost of innovating to
optimize manufacturing and distribution for local conditions) of 3, and some
future gain from improvements in public health, the present value of which is
at least as much as current income from compulsory licensing, or 4.1o5 WC's
"os It should be noted that the values used in this model are stylized for simplification
purposes, but they attempt to reflect rough orders of magnitude with regard to actual factors.
See IMS, Global Pharmaceutical Sales 2000 - 2007, http://www.imshealth.com/
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COMPULSORY ANTI-RETRO VIRAL LICENSING
total payoff from licensing should then be 10-3-3+4, or 8. If WC licenses and
D diverts, say, 50% of the licensee's stock, WC's revenues fall to 5, its costs
remain unchanged, and its future gains are erased as treatment does not reach a
critical mass of its populace. In this event, WC's total payoff falls to -1.
If WC foregoes, it earns no revenues from licensing, and it incurs no costs
associated with manufacturing or distribution. WC misses out on the future
gains from stabilization of the public health situation, but it may receive other
gains from this strategy. If WC forgoes, it is likely to be in compliance with
the expectations of PO and its government under the relevant free trade
agreement or bilateral trade agreement. If PO and its government are satisfied
with WC's performance, then drug donations and favorable trade treatment
may follow. We assume that such favorable treatment is worth 3 to WC. If
WC forgoes and D diverts, WC will earn no licensing revenues, incur no costs,
and receive a perhaps slightly diminished gain from PO (e.g., if diversionary
activity affects donated drugs or any market rate drugs in circulation). WC's
total payoff in this event is 2.
D faces a strategy choice of Divert vs. Refrain. Assuming that D's direct
costs of diversion (transportation, mainly), opportunity costs of diversion (from
not pursuing other economic activity), likelihood of detection, and cost of
being detected remain low, Divert is a profitable strategy for D, allowing him
to reap all or most of the revenue from diverting the product. Diverting 50%
of production in the event of a License decision by WC will lead to a payoff
for D of 5. Even if WC foregoes, there will still be a positive payoff to be had
by D, by siphoning of some of the other gains that WC receives for foregoing
(Donated and/or market rate medicines can be diverted as readily as
compulsorily licensed ones). The gain from diversion is greater under
(License, Divert) than it is under (Forego, Divert), because there are more
drugs in the stream of commerce under the former combination of strategies.1 06
D's total payoff falls to 2 under (Forego, Divert).
PO's full (worldwide) revenues are assumed to be 100. In the event of a
Refrain strategy being employed by D, PO earns its full revenues. If there is
diversion, PO is assumed to suffer a 20% reduction in revenues in high price
markets, to 80. If WC licenses, PO will receive some benefit in future periods
from WC's local innovation. Some portion of such innovation could become
deployedfiles/imshealth/Global/Content/StaticFile/TopLine_Data/GlobalSales.pdf (global
pharmaceutical sales were approximately $700B in 2007) (last visited June 7, 2010); About
Phrma, http://www.phrma.org/about_phrma/ (global pharmaceutical research and
development spending was approximately S65B in 2009) (last visited June 7, 2010); DAVID
R. SUGDEN, GRAY MARKETS: PREVENTION, DETECTION, AND LITIGATION 24 (2009) (revenues
lost to the gray market annually of approximately SlOB); Medicines Australia, Global
Pharmaceutical Industry - Facts at a Glance, http://www.medicinesaustralia.com.au/
pages/images/Global%20-%20facts%20at%20a%20glance.pdf (market share in the
developed vs. developing world: North America: 45%, Europe: 20%, Japan: 10%, United
Kingdom: 3%, Australia: 1%, Rest of World, including many of the markets that are
potential Waiver Countries: 21%) (last visited June 7, 2010).
106 (Donated Drugs + Market Rate Drugs + Licensed Drugs) vs. (Donated Drugs +
Market Rate Drugs).
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part of PO's overall store of know-how, and could feed product development
in other markets. We assume for simplicity that PO's gain from local
innovation is equivalent to WC's local innovation expenditure of 3. A License
strategy by WC also increases PO's revenues in future periods (due to the
economic stabilization that should flow from public health stabilization). We
will assume that the present value of such increased revenues is equivalent to
5% of PO's current worldwide revenues. If WC foregoes, PO receives no
benefit from local innovation, and its revenues are flat in future periods. The
payoffs of all three players are given in the table below for each combination
of strategies by WC and D. In each cell, WC's payoff is given first, D's payoff
second, and PO's payoff third.
Figure B
D
Refrain Divert
WC License 8, 0, 108 -1, 5, 88
Forego 3,0, 100 2,2,80
In this game, D's Divert strategy is strictly dominant. 0 7 No matter which
strategy WC chooses, D is better off choosing Divert and may be expected
always to do so. Given that D will always choose Divert, WC's best strategy is
Forego. Choosing Forego saves WC the costs associated with licensing and
delivers some benefit in the way of largesse from PO. Licensing in the face of
D's Divert strategy is a recipe for a negative payoff. This outcome of the game
produces equilibrium without producing an access solution. The players
maximize their payoffs in understandable but access-limiting ways.
It should be noted that the foregone access opportunity is not necessarily a
win for PO. PO reaps potential benefits from a License decision in the form of
local innovation gains and increased future revenues, but under a Forego
strategy those benefits never materialize. Only alterations to the players'
expected payoffs, and commitment by the players' to actions that will deliver
such payoffs, will increase the likelihood of PO (and humanity in general)
reaping the benefits of the License strategy.
How might the players' payoffs be altered? First, D's likelihood and cost of
detection must be increased. One approach to such an increase would be for
PO to commit to funding detection activities to be carried out on the ground by
WC. PO is probably better positioned to provide the resources to bolster the
investigatory apparatus, but WC controls the investigatory apparatus and
knows the local players. Deployment of the resources is better left in WC's
hands. As a further incentive to actively detect, the royalty rate owed by WC
and/or its licensee to PO could be on a sliding scale and tied to the level of
diversionary activity. The lower the amount of diversion, the smaller the
107 A strictly dominant strategy is one that is always the player's best choice, regardless
of the other player's strategy choice. See BAIRD, supra note 101, at 11; KREPS, supra note
99, at 26.
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COMPULSORY ANTI-RETRO VIRAL LICENSING
royalty that WC or the licensee would owe to PO. The combination of cheaper
detection (because of direct funding by PO) and cheaper licensing (because of
the lower royalty rate tied to reduced diversion) can increase WC's incentive to
choose a License strategy.
A second approach to altering the player's payoffs would be to reduce the
cost of local innovation and increase the benefit for local innovation, from
WC's perspective. Direct investment by PO is one clear way of reducing
WC's outlays for adaptive R&D, thus reducing the cost of the License strategy.
Increasing incentives to License can also be accomplished by enhancing WC's
gain from licensing. Allowing WC to participate in PO's worldwide gains
from exploitation of locally-developed know-how might achieve such an
enhancement. Importantly, both PO and WC gain from a commitment by PO
to partner with WC in pursuing local innovation, because if License is never
chosen, and local innovation never occurs, PO misses out on long term revenue
opportunities.
A third approach to payoff alteration involves increasing the opportunity
cost of D's decision to Divert. Again, direct investment by PO can play a role.
PO may invest directly in local distributors, providing handsome benefits for
local firms who respect the supply chain, and exacting penalties or terminating
relationships when breaches are detected. Similarly, PO may elect to share a
small portion of its gains from local innovation with D, subject to supply chain
integrity maintenance. The upshot of such an approach is to make it profitable
for D to allow the product to reach its intended destination, and very expensive
to deviate from PO's and WC's access goals. Creating a lucrative and
legitimate role for D gives D something to lose in choosing Divert.
Figure C
D
Refrain Divert
WC License 12, 3, 106 5, 0, 86
Forego 3, 0, 100 2, 0, 80
A goal for the local market might be the payoff set depicted in Figure C
above. In this scheme, a (License, Refrain) combination leads to WC earning
current revenues of 10, as before, but having distribution costs absorbed by
PO, gaining 4 from stabilization, and receiving 1/3 of PO's local innovation
gain of 3. WC's payoff is thus 10-3+4+1=12. D receives legitimate
distribution revenue of 2, and a local innovation gain equal to WC's, for a total
payoff of 3. In the event of a Divert decision by D, the penalties imposed by
PO erase any payoff for D and reduce WC's payoff by doubling its royalty rate
and eliminating its innovation gain share. As we assume diversion also
eliminates WC's stabilization gain, WC's payoff drops to 10-6=4, in the event
of a (License, Divert) combination. In any scenario where WC Foregoes, we
assume that its payoffs are unchanged from the former iteration. D's payoff is
assumed to always fall to 0 if it chooses Divert.
Although Figure C points us in the direction of a pro-access result that
2010] 191
HeinOnline -- 16 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 191 2010
]      
    i  r 
  r  
  i )   ti   
 
      
ti      
 i .    
       
i  i s     i  's 
i  t  i   
t ti  loped   
 t  
   r 
 ,    
 
    
 t   y   
 i    
  i   
   . l ,   
 i   
    t le 
  t    i  
. i   
t       
e  
 
  
  , , , 8  
 , 10  , 8  
  f   
, , ti   i g 
     
ti ,  1  '  ti n 
   .    
  ti   
 t  0,    
 f       
ti      
 i   f   t 
se, ti .  ,  
   
  
 ti   s  
B.U. J SCI. & TECH. L.
benefits PO, WC, D, and WC's citizens, achieving this result will be more
difficult than the normal form model indicates. The interactions among these
players will be dynamic and iterative. 08 Such interactions are often modeled
using extensive form games.109 Such a model is beyond the scope of this
Article, and further research is needed in order to define the precise form that
the players' interactions would take in such a game. Future work on these
issues could also go farther in positing the precise license terms that would
create the final alignment of incentives represented by Figure C.
VI. MOVING FORWARD ON ACCESS
This Article has explored an alternative to common thinking regarding
compulsory licensing. In a traditional all-or-nothing, zero-sum conception of
patents and compulsory licensing, the parties have little incentive to engage in
strategies that increase access to medicines for ordinary people. Patent owners
assume, rationally, that some parties are prepared to divert their product from
low income markets to high income markets. They pressure their governments
to pressure the governments of countries that might otherwise be interested in
issuing compulsory licenses. Fearing retaliation, potential Waiver countries do
not issue licenses because all of the distributors' incentives point toward a
decision to divert products to the gray market. Rather than incur the trade
wrath of developed countries, Waiver country governments choose the access-
limiting strategy of foregoing compulsory licensing.
What is needed is a view of compulsory licensing that gives multiple actors
a stake in the development of local know-how regarding the medicines and a
strong economic interest in protecting the integrity of the supply chain.
Investment by patent owners (and their governments) in the local innovation
infrastructures and anti-diversion apparatuses of countries interested in
utilizing the Waiver could go a long way toward decreasing the cost of
licensing and increasing the gains from such a strategy. Local players have the
ground-level knowledge to greatly enhance the value of the patent owner's
asset. The patent owner actually has the resources to put that knowledge to
use. By emphasizing a long term relationship (with repeatable wins and losses
for countries, their licensees, and distributors, depending on their level of
cooperation), and by being willing to share gains from innovation (which on a
percentage basis would probably have a significant impact on local player
payoffs), patent owners can help move the access debate away from old
thinking.
The co-op licensing model discussed here is influenced by the scholarly and
popular movement in intellectual property away from an absolute property
rights paradigm, concerned only with some mythic individual inventor's
incentive to innovate and need for a monopoly in order to innovate.
Innovation and technology policy can be used to serve both individual goals
108 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 98, at 33.
'0 See id.
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COMPULSORY ANTI-RETRO VIRAL LICENSING
and broader societal goals such as economic development.' 10 User innovation,
local innovation, and collaborative innovation, can enhance the value of a
patent owner's intellectual property and improve welfare for users at the same
time.III In fact, successful deployment of a technology in a given market may
depend on some form of user innovation or local knowledge.' 12 Ultimately,
the TRIPS access scheme will work only with local support, investment in
local capabilities, and local development leading to organic adoption of
intellectual property recognition, once more pressing issues of public health,
safety, and welfare are addressed.' 13
1' See generally, e.g., Peter K. Yu, Building Intellectual Property Coalitions for
Development, in IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION'S
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 79 (Jeremy de Beer ed., 2009), available at
http://www.idrc.calopenebooks/454-3/.
I See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS and Essential Medicines: Must One Size Fit
All? Making the WTO Responsive to the Global Health Crisis, in INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL
PUBLIC HEALTH: PATENT LAW AND ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDIC[NES 51, 58-60 (Thomas
Pogge, Matthew Rimmer & Kim Rubenstien, eds., forthcoming 2010) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1443248; Katherine J. Strandburg,
Evolving Innovation Paradigms and the Global Intellectual Property Regime, 41 CONN. L.
REV. 861, 871 (2009).
12 See Strandburg, supra note 111, at 876-78.
113 See generally Lanjouw, supra note 12.
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